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COMMENTS
"PERMANENTLY RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES
UNDER COLOR OF LAW:" GUIDELINES FOR A MORE
PRECISE INTERPRETATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Establishing the precise meaning of "permanently residing in
the United States under color of law" is critical; that determination
prescribes which aliens are eligible to receive many federally-funded
benefits such as unemployment compensation, medicaid and welfare
assistance. For example, section 1264 of the California Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act states that benefits are payable to aliens
who are "permanently residing in the United States under color of
law" at the time the services are rendered.' Despite the importance
of that phrase, few courts have interpreted it. In fact, no California
appellate court has construed that language. Because of the increas-
ing public concern over uncontrolled immigration into the United
States and alien rights, a precise definition of "permanently residing
under color of law" is needed.
The term "permanently residing under color of law" can be
traced to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, section 3304(a)(14).2
That federal statute states that no alien may be paid unemployment
benefits unless he is "permanently residing in the United States
C 1986 by Blanca Zaraz6a
1. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1264(a) (West 1978).
The full language of the statute is:
Unemployment compensation benefits, extended duration benefits, and fed-
eral-state extended benefits shall not be payable on the basis of services per-
formed by an alien unless such alien is an individual who was lawfully admitted
for permanent residence at the time such services were performed, was lawfully
present for purposes of performing such services, or was permanently residing
in the United States under color of law at the time such services were per-
formed, including an alien who was lawfully present in the United States as a
result of the application of the provisions of Section 203(a)(7) of Section
212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Id.
2. 26 U.S;C. §§ 2501-4000 (1982). See infra text accompanying note 11.
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under color of law." Therefore, whether an alien is eligible for
these unemployment benefits hinges on the exact meaning of "per-
manently residing in the United States under color of law."
The legislature has provided no clear statement of intent with
respect to section 3304.4 For clues to the meaning of "permanently
residing under color of law," therefore, one must turn to the few
cases decided under section 3304 and under federal and state statutes
with identical language. Holley v. Lavine5 is the landmark case
which interprets "permanently residing under color of law." In the
context of determining eligibility for welfare benefits, the court held
that the plaintiff was residing "under color of law" because the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) knew of her presence in
the United States, yet had decided not to deport her. Moreover, the
plaintiff was "permanently residing in the United States" because:
1) her relationship with the United States was of a "continuing or
lasting nature," and 2) she was allowed to remain in the United
States until her. children were no longer dependent upon her.'
Although subsequent cases have followed the Holley rationale,
many state agencies in charge of administering unemployment com-
pensation programs do not adhere to the Holley interpretation.' Cal-
ifornia's Employment Development Department (EDD) is a leading
example. Through regulation number 1264-1, the EDD sought to
condition alien eligibility for unemployment benefits on requirements
imposed by neither Congress nor the state legislature. The EDD's
action highlights the need for a more precise interpretation of "resid-
ing under color of law."8
3. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (1982).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 26-28 for a discussion of legislative intent.
5. Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nor., Shang v.
Holley, 435 U.S. 947 (1978).
6. Id. at 851. See infra text accompanying notes 41-56.
7. Numerous claims have been filed against employment security agencies in California,
Colorado, Texas, Utah and other states. The cases cited in this comment provide evidence of
this phenomenon.
8. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1264 raises a constitutional issue. Because aliens are
protected by those federal constitutional provisions which refer to "persons," they receive pro-
tection under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. The equal protection guar-
antee mandates that the government treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner. As a
result, the question arises whether § 1264 should be invalidated as an arbitrary refusal to
accord equal treatment to lawful residents who are not citizens. In distinguishing between
citizens and aliens who are lawfully admitted or lawfully present, California may be denying
aliens equal treatment in the disbursement of unemployment benefits. This inquiry requires an
analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's three standards of review for alienage cases. See Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971); In re Grifliths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978); Ambach v. Norwick,
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This comment asserts that administrative abuse in the disburse-
ment of unemployment benefits is the result of an imprecise defini-
tion of "permanently residing under color of law." Although Holley
and subsequent cases clearly delineate factors which should be con-
sidered in determining alien eligibility for unemployment benefits,
this is insufficient. Administrative agencies, as well as judges and at-
torneys, need guidelines for applying the standards of Holley and
section 3304. Therefore, this comment proposes guidelines to clarify
the meaning of "permanently residing in the United States under
color of law." The proposed guidelines will bring clarity and preci-
sion to a vague phrase.
II. THE PRESENT DEFINITION OF "PERMANENTLY RESIDING IN
THE UNITED STATES UNDER COLOR OF LAW"
A. Statutes
The phrase "permanently residing in the United States under
color of law" appears in the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA) section 3304(a)(14)(A). In pertinent part the federal statute
reads:
[C]ompensation shall not be payable on the basis of services
performed by an alien unless such alien . .. was permanently
residing in the United States under color of law at the time
such services were performed . . . (including an alien who was
lawfully present in the United States as a result of the applica-
tion of the provisions of section 203(a)(7)1 or section 212(d)(5)"0
441 U.S. 68 (1979); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Matthews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432
U.S. 1 (1977).
Recently, the Supreme Court extended the scope of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to include unlawful resident aliens. In Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), the plaintiffs challenged a Texas statute which: 1) denied local school district funds for
the education of undocumented school children, and 2) allowed school districts to deny free
education to such children. The 5-4 majority struck down the statute as violative of equal
protection. As a result, resident aliens who are in the United States unlawfully can secure
constitutional protection from state or local laws which arbitrarily deny them benefits or im-
pose burdens upon them. However, under this narrow ruling it is difficult to predict whether
the equal protection guarantee will continue to expand. These constitutional issues will not be
addressed in this comment.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 203(a)(7) was a conditional entry provision of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(A)(7)). According to its terms, aliens who
were fleeing communist persecution, fleeing the Middle East to escape persecution, or who
were uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity were allowed conditional entry into the United
States. Two years after their conditional entry, these aliens could petition to adjust their status
to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. A 1980 amendment, PuB. L.
No. 96-212, 8 U.S.C. § § 203(c)(1)-(6), eliminated this provision from the INA.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 212(d)(5) allows the Immigration and Naturalization Service discretion
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of the Immigration and Nationality Act."
The phrase "permanently residing in the United States under color
of law" does not appear in the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), 2 nor does it appear in the federal regulations relating to im-
migration." The Department of Labor (DOL), however, has added
some clarity to this vague phrase.
1. Department of Labor Interpretation
The unemployment benefits system is one aspect of the Social
Security System. 4 The provisions of the INA were incorporated into
the Internal Revenue Code under the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act (FUTA).' FUTA required each state to pass its own legislation
to provide unemployment programs.1 ' Although each state has been
allowed to develop its own particular program, each must follow the
FUTA general standards and guidelines. State employment security
agencies (SESA's) administer the program in their respective territo-
ries. The DOL often uses Unemployment Insurance Program Let-
ters (UIPL's) to inform the SESA's of its interpretation of federal
statutory requirements.17
The DOL has followed that procedure with regard to the re-
strictions on benefit payments to aliens appearing pursuant to section
3304.18 UIPL 15-78 contains the DOL's interpretation of individu-
to parole apparently inadmissible aliens into the country for whatever reasons and duration it
considers appropriate.
11. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A) (1976) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited in text as
FUTA].
12. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1251 (1964) (hereinafter cited in text as INA].
13. 8 C.F.R. §§ 101-499 (1984). These regulations are issued by the INS. They explain
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524, the federal immigration laws, and cover topics such as the maximum
number of admissions, asylum procedures, and refugee assistance.
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1397 (1982).
15. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14) (1982). See also M.E. MADDEN, EMPLOYER'S COMPLETE
GUIDE To UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION (1979).
16. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 301 (West 1973). In California, the unemployment in-
surance program is administered by the Employment Development Department [hereinafter
cited as EDDI.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 503 (1982); 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1976). Because the consequences of non-
compliance are severe, these UIPL's are a vital source of information for the SESA's. If a state
does not comply with federal statutory requirements, the DOL can withhold federal funds
used to administer the state's program. Moreover, the DOL can revoke the federal tax credit
against state unemployment taxes paid by employers if a state does not comply with federal
statutory requirements.
18. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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als "permanently residing in the United States under color of law."
This interpretation states that aliens falling within this category are
those residing in the United States "permanently" or "continuously
for a long period of time," and who entered the United States under
conditions that appear to be lawful. 9
This language suggests that two factors determine whether an
alien is "permanently residing in the United States under color of
law." In particular, the duration and continuity of the alien's resi-
dence in the United States, as well as the nature of the alien's entry
should be examined. If a claimant was in the United States for a
short period of time, and frequently visited outside the country, he
has not resided "continuously for a long period of time"2 ° in the
United States. Similarly, a claimant who was seized while illegally
attempting to cross a United States border has not entered this coun-
try under "conditions that appear to be lawful."'" Conversely, if an
alien shows that he has resided in the United States continuously for
a long time, and that he has entered the country under lawful condi-
tions, this evidence should support his "color of law" claim. There-
fore, any proof of these two factors should support an alien's claim
for unemployment compensation benefits.
An agency's interpretation of the statutes that the agency is
charged to enforce is a substantial factor to consider in construing a
statute.22 Therefore, the two factors cited above-entry conditions
and residency characteristics-deserve special attention in construing
section 3304. At the same time, the degree of deference accorded to
an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute depends, in
part, on its thoroughness."3 Although the DOL has discussed "per-
19. Unemployment Ins. Program Letter No. 15-78 (January 24, 1978).
20. Id.
21. Id. But see Antillon v. Department of Employment Security, discussed infra notes
90-93. Unlawful entry is not necessarily a bar to alien eligibility for unemployment benefits.
In the Antillon case, the plaintiff did not make a lawful entry. Nonetheless, the court found
him eligible for unemployment benefits.
22. Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 235-36 (1976).
23. St. Martin Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 783 n.13 (1981). In
this case, a church sought exemption from unemployment compensation taxes imposed by the
FUTA. See supra text accompanying note 12. FUTA, 26 U.S.C. § 3304, provides an exemp-
tion for employees of a "church." In rejecting the DOL's interpretation of "church," the South
Dakota Supreme Court cited Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944):
The amount of deference due an administrative agency interpretation of a stat-
ute, however, "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronounce-
ments, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control."
19861
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manently residing under color of law" elsewhere,24 the DOL has not
thoroughly interpreted section 3304.
Because the DOL's interpretation is incomplete, other clues to
the meaning of section 3304 must be found. Rules of statutory con-
struction require that a statute be interpreted according to its plain
language, unless a clear and contrary legislative intent is shown.
Therefore, the legislative history of section 3304 will now be
reviewed.
Prior to 1976, the federal statutes concerning unemployment in-
surance benefit programs25 did not cover alien eligibility for such
benefits. However, under the Unemployment Compensation Amend-
ments of 19766 aliens were specifically included. The amendments
provided benefits only to aliens lawfully admitted for permanent
residency, lawfully present for purposes of performing services, or
permanently residing in the United States under color of law. Unfor-
tunately, congressional discussion does not reveal the precise mean-
ing of the statute.27
The phrase also appears in statutes which restrict alien eligibil-
The DOL limited its interpretation of "church" to a physical building without including
the notion of a congregation or church authorities conducting a business. As a result, the South
Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the DOL's interpretation did not warrant deference.
24. Unemployment Ins. Program Letter No. 15-78 (January 24, 1978) also states that
aliens residing in the United States "under color of law" must have an Alien Registration
Receipt Card, commonly known as a "green card." This statement is incorrect. Under the
current regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 264.2, only persons lawfully admitted for permanent residence
may obtain a "green card." See 2 C.GORDoN & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION & PROCE-
DURE § 6.17(a) (1984).
Another document prepared by the DOL also mentions the phrase in question. In Draft
Language and Commentary to Implement the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of
1976, the DOL cites language from 8 C.F.R. §§ 101.1 and 101.2. These sections delineate
categories of persons who are presumed to have been lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence. The categories include: aliens entering the United States prior to June 30, 1906; aliens
entering the Virgin Islands prior to July 1, 1938; certain Chinese aliens entering the United
States prior to July 1, 1924; and Mexican citizens entering the United States across the Mexi-
can border prior to July 1, 1908. Although these categories of persons are considered to be
"permanently residing in the United States under color of law," the document gives no further
explanation. These persons share one common experience: they all entered the United States at
least 25 years ago. Apparently, the DOL is merely buttressing its assertion that an alien is
"permanently residing in the United States under color of law" if he has resided in the United
States "for a long period of time."
25. The pertinent federal statues are: 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-4 (1982); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1108 (1982); and 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3310 (1976).
26. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, PuB. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat.
2667 (1976).
27. See 122 CONG. REC. 22910 (1976). The debate concerning this language discloses
only that Congress wanted to define more precisely those aliens who would be precluded from
receiving unemployment benefits.
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ity for benefits under Social Security programs. No alien can receive
social security benefits unless he has been lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence or is otherwise "permanently residing in the
United States under color of law. '2'8 However, no explanation of this
Social Security Act language appears in the congressional records. 29
Indeed, the legislative history of the Act provides limited information
concerning the meaning of the phrase.
Congress intended to grant benefits to those aliens who were not
lawfully admitted for permanent residence but who were allowed
nonetheless to remain in the United States." However, this category
of aliens remains undefined by the status. It is unclear exactly when
an alien has been "allowed" to remain in the United States. Further-
more, it is unclear whether an alien who has been allowed to remain
in the United States is automatically eligible for unemployment ben-
efits. Because a clear legislative intention is not evident, one must
turn to the common law interpretation of section 3304.
B. Holley and Its Progeny
Section 3304 refers to two sections of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act (INA). More specifically, section 3304 refers to INA
provisions concerning refugees and parolees."1 Because of these two
sections, section 3304 presumably concerns a claimant's immigration
status. Therefore, an analysis of "permanently residing in the United
States under color of law" under section 3304 should include at least
some reference to the INA.12
According to the INA, "permanent" refers to a relationship
which is not temporary, but rather of a "continuing or lasting na-
ture."33 Moreover, the INA ambiguously describes "permanent" as a
relationship which may be "dissolved eventually at the insistence ei-
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(33) (1982) (Aid to Families With Dependent Children
(AFDC)); 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c)(a)(l)(B)(ii) (1982) (SSI). See also 20 C.F.R. § 416.202(b)
(1983) (SSI); 42 C.F.R. § 435.402(b) (1983) (Medicaid); 45 C.F.R. § 233.50 (1983) (AFDC,
Aid to the Blind, and Assistance to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled).
29. During 1971 and 1972, public concern over uncontrolled immigration into the
United States prompted the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration to hold public
hearings on alien-related issues. As a result of the hearings, the Subcommittee decided to re-
strict the availability of alien benefits under the Social Security Act. Discussion concerning this
decision included the suggestion that some aliens not lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence but allowed to remain in the United States by the INS, should be disqualified from
receiving benefits. No reasons were given for this suggestion.
30. See supra note 27.
31. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
32. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1557 (1964).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (1964).
1986]
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ther of the United States or of the individual." 4 In addition, the
INA defines "residence" as the alien's place of "general abode," or
"actual dwelling place."3"
The term "color of law" does not appear in the INA. But the
term has been subject to interpretation in a variety of legal contexts.
In 1899 the United States Supreme Court defined "color of law" for
the first time: " 'color of law' does not mean actual law. 'Color' as a
modifier... means 'appearance as distinguished from reality.' Color
of law means 'mere semblance of legal right.' "36 Similarly, Black's
Law Dictionary defines "color of law" as the "appearance or sem-
blance without the substance of legal right.""7
A purely linguistic analysis suggests that an alien is "perma-
nently residing under color of law" if he makes his abode in the
United States, and if he does so under an apparent claim of legal
right. Furthermore, this analysis suggests how a claimant can use
this definition to qualify for unemployment benefits. First, a claim-
ant can show that his relationship with the United States is "perma-
nent," or of a "continuing or lasting nature."88 Second, he can
demonstrate that the United States is his principal, actual dwelling
place.8 ' In other words, he can show that the United States is his
"residence." Finally, the claimant can show that he has undertaken
this "permanent residence" under an apparent claim of legal right.
That is, he can show that he is residing here under apparently law-
ful circumstances.' °
These clues are informative. However, a thorough inquiry into
the plain language of section 3304 must go beyond mere linguistic
evaluation. One must also examine those cases decided under section
3304, as well as those few cases decided under identical language in
34. Id.
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) (1964). "The term 'residence' means the place of general
abode . . . principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent." Id.
36. McCain v. City of Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168, 175 (1899). In that case, residents of
Greenwood Park, Iowa sued the City of Des Moines for assessing taxes against their property.
The city levied the taxes pursuant to an act which purported to extend the limits of Des
Moines so as to include Greenwood Park. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the residents
that the act was void. Nonetheless, it found that annexation of Greenwood Park by Des
Moines was lawful because it was made under "color of law." In connection with this conclu-
sion, the court stated " 'Color of law' does not mean actual law. 'Color' as a modifier, in legal
parlance, means 'appearance as distinguished from reality.' Color of law means 'mere sem-
blance of legal right.' " Id.
37. BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 331 (4th ed. 1968).
38. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26
UNDER COLOR OF LAW
other federal and state statutes.
1. Holley v. Lavine
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Holley v. Lavine4 in-
terpreted the specific language in question. In that case, a Canadian
citizen, who was in the United States unlawfully but whose six chil-
dren were citizens, challenged a provision of the New York Social
Services Law. 42 Prior to August of 1974, the plaintiff had been re-
ceiving AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) benefits
under the Social Security Act.4 However, the New York Social Ser-
vices Law, enacted in August 1974, provides that aliens unlawfully
residing in the United States are not eligible for AFDC.4 Pursuant
to this law, the plaintiff continued to receive AFDC for her six chil-
dren, but ceased receiving payments on her own account as a parent.
The INS knew of the plaintiff's unlawful presence in the United
States; yet, deportation proceedings were not instituted. The INS is-
sued a formal letter stating that, because of "humanitarian reasons,"
it would not deport the plaintiff until her children were no longer
dependent upon her.4
Although the plaintiff was ineligible for benefits according to
state law, the court addressed the issue of whether that law was con-
sistent with the federal regulations concerning aliens' rights to re-
ceive AFDC.4' Like section 3304, the federal AFDC regulation lim-
41. 553 F.2d 845 (2d. Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom., Shang v. Holley, 435 U.S. 947
(1978).
42. The plaintiff challenged N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 131-k-(1) (Consol. 1983). See
infra note 44 and accompanying text.
43. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602-15 (1982).
44. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131-k-(1) (Consol. 1983).
45. Holley, 553 F.2d at 849.
46. Id. at 847; see generally 45 C.F.R. § 233.50 (1984).
Citizenship and Alienage: A state plan . . . of the Social Security Act shall
provide that an otherwise eligible individual, dependent child, or a caretaker
relative or any other persons whose needs are considered in determining the
need of the child or relative claiming aid, must be either:
(a) A citizen, or
(b) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise perma-
nently residing in the United States under color of law, including certain aliens
lawfully present in the United States as a result of the application of the follow-
ing provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act:
(1) Section 207(c) [refugees]
(2) Section 203(a)(7)[conditional entrant refugees)
(3) Section 208 [aliens granted political asylum]
(4) Section 212(d)(5) [aliens granted temporary parole status].
45 C.F.R. § 233.50 (1984).
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its benefits to those aliens who are "permanently residing in the
United States under color of law." The court began by recognizing
that "color of law" includes actions not covered by specific legal
authorization:
It embraces not only situations within the body of law, but also
others enfolded by a colorable imitation. "[U]nder color of law"
means that which an official does by virtue of power, as well as
what he does by virtue of right. The phrase encircles the law,
its shadows, and its penumbra .... under color of law" ...
[includes] cases that are, in strict terms, outside the law but are
near the border.4
The opinion states that "color of law" includes cases in which
an official uses his discretion not to enforce a statutory mandate. Be-
cause enforcement may inflict consequences beyond what lawmakers
contemplated, an official may deliberately abstain from imposing
penalties upon "known violators."'48 The INS knew that the plaintiff
was in the United States unlawfully. In fact, the plaintiff had fully
disclosed her situation to the INS. Yet the INS chose not to deport
her. In this case, those charged with the power of enforcement did
not impose penalties upon a known violator. As a consequence, the
plaintiff could be categorized as residing in the United States "under
color of law."
In concluding that the plaintiff was "permanently" residing in
the United States, the court referred to INA language. As previously
mentioned,49 the INA defines "permanent" as a relationship of con-
tinuing or lasting nature which can be dissolved by either the United
States or by the individual. 0 The court accepted this definition of
"permanent.""1 Two other sections of the INA were also mentioned.
More specifically, the court cited two statutory sections concerning
refugees and parolees. These statutory sections appear in section
3304 and in the federal regulations that were examined in Holley. 2
The opinion states that these sections describe instances in which an
alien is permitted to stay in the United States "not necessarily for-
ever, but only so long as he is in a particular condition."58 According
to the court, the plaintiff's situation was another such "particular
47. Holley, 553 F.2d at 849-50.
48. Id. at 850.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 38.
50. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (1982); see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
51. Holley, 553 F.2d at 850-51.
52. See supra note 46 and text accompanying note 11.
53. Holley, 553 F.2d at 851.
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condition." The plaintiff, a Canadian citizen, was permitted to stay
in the United States at least until all her children had grown to ma-
jority age. The "particular condition" was the children's dependency
upon their mother, the plaintiff. Moreover, because the plaintiff's
ties were so close to six United States citizens, the Department of
Justice was not likely to deport the plaintiff to Canada."'
Holley definitely clarifies the phrase "permanently residing
under color of law." According to Holley, a claimant is in the United
States "under color of law" if the INS knows of his unlawful pres-
ence but chooses not to enforce sanctions against him.5 Of course,
the INS cannot decide whether or not to deport an alien if it does
not first know of his presence. Therefore, the INS knowledge of the
claimant's presence in the United States is of fundamental impor-
tance. If the claimant is able to show that the INS knew of his pres-
ence and the INS failed to deport him, then this information should
buttress his assertion that he is residing in the United States "under
color of law." Before requiring any evidence from the INS, the
claimant should provide evidence of INS knowledge of his presence.
For example, he can submit a copy of his application for permanent
resident status, receipt of which has been acknowledged by the INS.
This is a relatively inexpensive and accessible source of proof for the
claimant. Furthermore, this procedure will avoid placing an unnec-
essary burden on the INS. The INS need not affirmatively refute, in
every case, the claimant's contention that he has never been deported.
Only after the claimant has made an initial showing of INS knowl-
edge should the INS be burdened with such a task.
To further support his claim for benefits, the claimant should
provide evidence confirming that he is "permanently residing" in the
United States. Again, Holley offers some guidance. He should show
that his relationship with the United States is of a "continuing or
lasting nature.""0 Moreover, the claimant should offer evidence of
"particular conditions" such as those presented in the Holley case.57
For instance, the claimant can show ties with United States citizens
who depend on the claimant for their welfare. Marriage and birth
certificates are one type of inexpensive proof which the claimant can
offer.
54. Id.
55. Holley, 553 F.2d at 849-50.
56. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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2. Subsequent Cases
Several courts since Holley have construed the language of sec-
tion 3304. In Velasquez v. Secretary of the Department of Health
and Human Services,5" a federal district court interpreted "perma-
nently residing in the United States under color of law" under the
Social Security Act. The plaintiff, a Mexican citizen, entered the
United States in 1972 as a temporary non-immigrant visitor. 9 After
she overstayed her visa by nine years, the INS initiated deportation
proceedings. 0 On August 11, 1981, the plaintiff filed an application
for suspension of deportation" with the INS. The plaintiff was
granted employment authorization62 for the duration of the deporta-
tion proceedings. For more than one year, the INS took no action in
the deportation case. An administrative law judge evaluated the
plaintiff's claim for social security benefits and decided that she had
failed to prove that she was "permanently residing in the United
States under color of law" as required by the Social Security Act."'
As a result, the Department of Health and Human Services denied
her social security benefits.
In overruling the decision, the district court relied on Holley.6"
However, it also distinguished the facts in Holley from those at bar.
In Holley, an INS official issued a formal assurance that the INS did
not contemplate deporting the alien because of "humanitarian rea-
sons."65 In Velasquez, the plaintiff presented no such explicit evi-
dence; she merely demonstrated a history of INS inaction. This was
sufficient for the court to conclude that the Department of Health
and Human Services had the burden of proving the INS's inten-
58. 581 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (1984).
60. Velasquez, 581 F. Supp. at 17.
61. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1984).
62. See Velasquez, 581 F. Supp. at 17; see generally 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 6.19 (1984).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c)(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Social Security Act contains the exact lan-
guage found in FUTA § 3304(a)(14)(A):
The term "aged, blind or disabled individual" means an individual who.., is a
resident of the United States, and is either (i) a citizen or (ii) an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence or otherwise permanently residing in the
United States under color of law.
Id.
The principal difference between FUTA and SSA is that § 1382 refers to eligibility for
social security benefits, while § 3304 refers to unemployment compensation benefits.
64. Velasquez, 581 F. Supp. at 18.
65. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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tions." At this point, however, the claimant was not ineligible for
benefits.
Papadopoulos v. Shang,67 a New York appellate court case,
involved alien eligibility for federally-funded benefits. In that case,
subsequent to her entry as a visitor, the plaintiff filed an application
for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident.6" While her
application was pending, the plaintiff suffered a stroke and incurred
medical expenses for which she sought reimbursement through
Medicaid. Like section 3304, Medicaid regulations provide for bene-
fits only to aliens who are "permanently residing in the United
States under color of law."6
According to INS Operating Instructions, 0 an applicant for ad-
justment of status may not be deported if he is immediately eligible
to receive an immigrant visa for permanent residence. In Papado-
poulos, the plaintiff was immediately eligible to receive an immi-
grant visa; therefore, the INS could not deport her. The court found
that the plaintiff qualified for medical benefits precisely because the
INS could not deport her.71 As in Holley, eligibility for benefits de-
pended, at least in part, on the failure of the INS to deport the
plaintiff.
Another New York appellate court construed "permanently re-
siding under color of the law" in St. Francis Hospital v. D'Elia.7 1
In that case, the plaintiff entered the United States using a valid
non-immigrant visitor's visa. 78 Prior to the expiration of her non-
immigrant visa, she applied for an immigrant visa.74 After the plain-
tiff's non-immigrant visa had expired, the Department of State wrote
to her at her residence in the United States. The Department of
State explained that processing of her application would be delayed.
The INS, however, took no action to deport the plaintiff."" The
plaintiff later applied for, and was denied medical assistance on the
66. Velasquez, 581 F. Supp. at 18.
67. 67 A.D.2d 84, 414 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1979).
68. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, aliens may file appli-
cations to adjust their status to that of a permanent resident. Also, INS Operating Instruction
242.1(a)(25) provides that aliens filing such applications shall not have deportation proceed-
ings initiated against them while the application for adjustment is pending.
69. 42 C.F.R. § 435.402(b)(1983).
70. Immigration and Naturalization Service Operating Instructions, OR 242(a)(25).
71. Papadopoulos, 67 A.D.2d at 85, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
72. 71 A.D.2d 110, 422 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1979); aff'd, 53 N.Y.2d 825, 422 N.E.2d 830,
440 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1981).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(B) (1964).
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1964).
75. St. Francis, 71 A.D.2d at 119, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
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ground that she failed to establish lawful residence.7 6
The appellate court in St. Francis, relying on Papadopoulos
and Holley, found the plaintiff eligible for medical assistance. The
court noted that, according to Papadopoulos, an alien is eligible for
medical assistance if he is "permanently residing in the United States
under color of law."' The St. Francis court also quoted Holley's
broad definition of "color of law." 8 In making its determination, the
court emphasized certain facts of the case before it. It restated the
following facts: the plaintiff made a valid entry; she filed a timely
application for an immigrant visa; she corresponded with the De-
partment of State; and the INS failed to deport her. In the court's
view, application of Papadopoulos and Holley to those facts com-
pelled the conclusion that the plaintiff was eligible for medical
benefits.8"
An Oregon state court reached a similar conclusion in Rubio v.
Employment Division.8" The plaintiff in Rubio began working in
1979, while he was in the United States unlawfully. In 1980 he
married a United States citizen who filed an application for perma-
nent residence on his behalf. The INS notified the plaintiff's wife
that it had approved her petition, and that it was being forwarded to
the Department of State for processing. At the same time, the INS
sent a form to the claimant granting him three months to voluntarily
depart the country. 2 The INS renewed this grant every three
months until he eventually received permanent resident status. 8
Prior to receiving permanent resident status, the claimant applied for
unemployment benefits. The benefits were denied on the ground that
he was not legally authorized to work in the United States.
The Rubio court cited Holley in holding that the claimant was
eligible for unemployment benefits. According to the Oregon court,
76. See N.Y. Soc. SERov. LAW § 131-k-(l) (Consol. 1983).
77. Papadopoulos, 67 A.D.2d at 87, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 154.
78. See supra text accompanying note 47.
79. Id.
80. St. Francis, 71 A.D.2d at 120, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
81. 66 Or. App. 525, 674 P.2d 1201 (1984).
82. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1964); 8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1983). The INS issued the claim-
ant a "voluntary departure" or form 1-210. Federal regulations permit the INS to grant a
person an indefinite time within which to voluntarily depart the United States.
83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(31) (1964); 8 U.S.C. § 1151-53 (1964). In order to ob-
tain lawful permanent status, an alien must first establish the existence of either close family
ties in the United States or the ability to perform a job for which there are no domestic work-
ers available. Secondly, the alien must establish that he/she is not "excludable" from the
United States under the terms of U.S.C. § 212. Qualitative factors listed in the sections cited
above may prevent an alien from acquiring "permanent resident" status.
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the focus of inquiry was not whether the claimant was legally enti-
tled to work, but rather, whether he was "permanently residing in
the United States under color of law." '84 Because of the Holley rea-
soning, the facts in Rubio supported the conclusion that the claimant
was eligible to receive unemployment benefits. The claimant was
"permanently residing" because he was married to a United States
citizen, was working for a United States business, and was taking
necessary steps to achieve status as a legal permanent resident.8"
Furthermore, the claimant's residence was "under color of
law." To the extent that the INS sent a form granting voluntary
departure to the claimant's address, the INS knew that the claimant
was in the United States.8 Moreover, by its routine regular exten-
sions of the claimant's voluntary departure, the INS actually acqui-
esced in his residence. 87 The INS not only exercised its discretion
not to enforce the law,88 but it had also "knowingly maintained the
status quo" pending the outcome of the claimant's application for
permanent resident status.89
Rubio clearly indicates that a claimant who has been granted
extensions on his voluntary departure should present evidence of
such extensions in support of his claim for unemployment benefits.
State agencies in turn should accept certified copies of these exten-
sions. In this manner, the INS will not be burdened with unneces-
sary duplication of documents. Once the INS has issued a document
to the claimant, the claimant can present a certified copy of this doc-
ument to the state agency. The INS need not search for, copy, and
distribute documents which have already been given to the claimant.
Another case arising in the context of unemployment benefits is
Antillon v. Department of Employment Security.9" In 1980, Antillon
filed an application for permanent resident status. After personally
visiting the INS in January 1981, Antillon was placed under INS
docket and given one month to leave the country voluntarily.91 He
did not leave the country, and the INS took no further action. In
January of 1981, Antillon also applied for unemployment benefits in
84. Rubio, 66 Or. App. 525, 674 P.2d at 1203. See also Antillon, infra text accompa-
nying note 94. The court in Antillon held that the issue is whether the plaintiff was in the
United States under color of law, not whether he was authorized to work in the United States.
85. 66 Or. App. 525, 674 P.2d at 1202-03.
86. Rubio, 66 Or. App. 525, 674 P.2d at 1202-03.
87. Id.
88. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
89. Rubio, 66 Or. App. 525, 674 P.2d at 1203.
90. 688 P.2d 455 (Utah 1984).
91. See supra note 82.
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Utah. At the time Antillon applied for these benefits, he was already
under INS docket control. Antillon applied for suspension of depor-
tation9" in September 1981. The INS took no further action until a
year later. At that time, an order to show cause why Antillon should
not be deported was sent to his home address in the United States.
The order stated that Antillon was required to appear before a judge
at a date to be determined. However, no hearing date was ever set
and no hearing was held. The INS never acted on Antillon's appli-
cation for suspension of deportation, nor did it act on his application
for permanent resident status. When Antillon applied for unemploy-
ment benefits, his claim was denied on the grounds that he was in
the United States unlawfully and without a work permit. It should
be noted that Utah's state unemployment law regarding alien eligi-
bility is identical to section 3304 of the federal statute."S
As in Rubio,94 the Utah Supreme Court in Antillon empha-
sized that the issue was not whether Antillon initially entered the
United States illegally or whether he was legally entitled to work.
Rather, the question was whether he was in the United States under
"color of law" at the time he applied for unemployment benefits.9"
The court reviewed how the Rubio court had adopted the reasoning
in Holley. Applying Rubio and Holley to the facts presented, the
court found that Antillon did indeed qualify for unemployment bene-
fits. Antillon had applied for permanent resident status, and when he
applied for unemployment benefits, the INS knew he was in the
United States; in fact, he was under INS docket control. Further-
more, the INS knew where he was living; forms and notices had
been sent to Antillon's home address. Finally, the INS took no action
to deport Antillon or to act on his application for permanent resident
status. These facts convinced the Utah Supreme Court that Antillon
was "permanently residing under color of law" because: 1) the INS
knew of Antillon's presence in the United States, and 2) the INS
acquiesced to his presence by exercising its discretion not to enforce
the laws.96 Clearly, INS knowledge of the claimant's presence and
INS inaction were the determinative facts in the case.
92. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1964).
93. The Utah statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 1-35-4-5K (Supp. 1984), states that an alien
is ineligible for benefits unless he was "permanently residing under color of law at the time
services were rendered." As such, it is identical to 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(14)(A).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89.
95. Antillon, 688 P.2d at 458.
96. Id. at 459.
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Finally, in Sudomir v. McMahon,97 the Ninth Circuit clarified
the meaning of "permanently residing." This case involved claimants
who were denied welfare benefits. Their sole claim to these benefits
rested on their filing applications for political asylum. The court
cited the Holley case and stated that "permanently" does not mean
"forever."" This term, however, does not embrace "transitory, in-
choate or temporary relationships. '"99 A residence is temporary when
the alien's continued presence is solely dependent upon the favorable
outcome of his application for asylum. In other words, asylum appli-
cants are deemed to be residing temporarily when they "merely par-
ticipate in a process that gives rise to the possibility of official au-
thorization to remain indefinitely. 00
Sudomir is directly applicable in cases involving claimants who
have filed applications for political asylum or other applications for a
change in immigration status. Under Sudomir, filing an application
for political asylum is insufficient to entitle one to receive unemploy-
ment benefits. Other facts must be present before the claimant will
be considered to be "permanently residing."
Other language in the Sudomir opinion, however, can be used
by a claimant seeking to establish that he is "permanently residing."
According to the court, "permanent" does not embrace "transitory,
inchoate or temporary relationships."1' 1 Therefore, claimants seek-
ing unemployment benefits should present evidence negating the ex-
istence of a transitory, inchoate or temporary relationship with the
United States.
Holley was the first case to interpret the language of section
3304. Furthermore, subsequent cases have followed the Holley
court's reasoning. In certain respects, these cases simply affirm the
conclusions in Holley. For instance, Papadopoulos, St. Francis, and
Antillon each support the Holley conclusion that INS failure to de-
port is critical to a finding of "permanently residing under color of
law."10 2 Yet in other respects, the opinions expand the Holley deci-
sion. Rubio and Antilion do not simply state that INS knowledge
and inaction support a finding that the claimant qualifies for bene-
fits. Instead, these cases reach beyond Holley in concluding that INS
knowledge and inaction amount to an acquiescence to the alien's
97. Sudomir, 767 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1985).
98. Holley, 553 F.2d at 851.
99. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1462.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
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presence in the United States. 03
Sudomir also adds to the decision in Holley. As stated in the
Holley case, "permanent" does not mean "forever." In addition,
Sudomir asserted that the term does not include "transitory, inchoate
or temporary relationships.' °4 At any rate, Holley and its progeny
clarify what is meant by "permanently residing under color of law."
Indeed, all the determinative facts cited in these cases are useful to
indicate when a claimant should be considered eligible to receive un-
employment benefits. Nonetheless, the principles of Holley and sub-
sequent cases construing the language of section 3304 have not been
strictly followed. California serves as a prime example of this
practice.
III. CALIFORNIA: A CLASSIC CASE OF MISINTERPRETATION
A. The State's Unemployment Insurance Program
Section 1264 of the California Unemployment Insurance
Code' 05 recites the federal statute section 3304 verbatim. According
to both laws, unemployment benefits are payable to aliens who were
"permanently residing in the United States under color of law" at
the time services were rendered.'06 As a result, an alien cannot re-
ceive unemployment benefits unless he qualifies under Unemploy-
ment Insurance Code section 1264. In California, the Employment
Development Department (EDD) administers the state's unemploy-
ment insurance program.' 0 7 Consequently, the EDD is responsible
for ensuring that aliens are not paid benefits if they do not meet
Code requirements.
1. Regulation 1264-1: The EDD's Proposal
In determining alien eligibility for unemployment insurance
benefits, the EDD uses a departmental document known as the "Cit-
izenship Guide Card" (CGC).'08 The EDD does not require an
103. See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
105. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §1264(a) (1978).
106. Both CAL. UNEMP INS. CODE § 1264(a) and FUTA § 3304 (a)(14)(A) state that
benefits are not payable on the basis of services performed by an alien "unless such alien...
was permanently residing in the United States under color of law at the time such services
were performed."
107. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
108. Under, the CGC, once a claimant indicates noncitizenship status, he is asked a
series of questions used to determine his eligibility for unemployment benefits. Documentary
proof of immigration status is required only when the claimant does not respond affirmatively
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alien to provide documentary proof of immigration status in order to
qualify for unemployment benefits.1 09 As a result, under the CGC,
claimants need not wait for the INS to verify any information pro-
vided. The EDD has used the CGC since 1978. In 1984, however,
the EDD decided that the CGC did not provide adequate informa-
tion about an alien's eligibility for unemployment benefits.11°
Consequently, in August 1984, the EDD proposed a new regu-
lation, 1264-1.111 In pertinent part, 1264-1 reads:
To be eligible for benefits an alien must present documentary
proof that he/she was . . . permanently residing in the United
States under color of law at the time of performing the services
on which his/her claim is based. These aliens are . . . [a]liens
who have documentary evidence from the INS which states the
INS has made an affirmative decision that the alien may re-
main in the United States indefinitely.112
The provisions of this regulation would change the procedure used to
determine alien eligibility for unemployment benefits. More impor-
tantly, these provisions would render 1264 invalid.
2. Problems with Regulation 1264-1
At least three problems exist with 1264-1. First, by conditioning
compensation upon documentary evidence, 1264-1 conflicts with the
federal statute, section 3304. The states do have broad flexibility
to any of the questions posed. The questions asked under the CGC are:
1. Are you a U.S. citizen?
2. Are you now and were you when you earned the wages upon which you are
basing your claim lawfully admitted to the U.S. for permanent residence?
3. Are you now and were you when you earned the wages upon which you are
basing your claim both permanently residing in the U.S. and either (a) the
spouse or child of a -U.S. citizen, or (b) the parent of a U.S. citizen who is at
least 21 years of age?
4. Are you now and were you when you earned the wages upon which you are
basing your claim legally entitled to enter the U.S. to seek and accept work?
5. Are you now and were you when you earned the wages upon which you are
basing your claim either a conditional entrant, or paroled, into the U.S. with
authorization to work?
Field Office Directive 84-25UI, Cal. Employment Dev. Dep't (February 17, 1984).
109. See supra note 108. The claimant is required to provide documentary proof of
immigration status only if he is unable to respond affirmatively to any of the CGC questions.
110. CAL. EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP'T, INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, REGULA-
TIONS 22 CAC 12553(c)-1 AND 1264-1 (August 14, 1984).
111. CAL. EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP'T, ORDER ADOPTING, AMENDING, OR REPEALING
REGULATIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE CAL. EMPLOYMENT DEV. DEP'T (August 14,
1984).
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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with respect to the type of unemployment programs they establish;...
but Congress has ranked certain elements of the unemployment ben-
efits program as fundamental. In this respect, states cannot deviate
from standards established by Congress without clear evidence of
congressional authorization.' 14 In establishing their individual unem-
ployment compensation schemes, the state cannot work against the
section 3304 fundamental standards. Indeed, the federal courts have
repeatedly invalidated state statutes and policies that interpret eligi-
bility for benefits more narrowly than the provisions of section
3304.5 Nowhere in section 3304 does Congress state that an alien
is "permanently residing under color of law," and thereby eligible
for unemployment benefits only if he produces documentary evidence
of his immigration status.' By requiring INS documentation, 1264-
1 excludes from eligibility aliens which Congress did not intend to
exclude. Therefore, California Unemployment Insurance Code Sec-
tion 1264-1 conflicts with section 3304 and is invalid. 117
Second, 1264-1 is inconsistent with the statute it was designed
to implement, California Unemployment Insurance Code section
1264. " It is a fundamental rule of administrative law that a regula-
tion is valid only if it is consistent with the statute it implements.' 9
113. Report of the Committee on Economic Security: Hearings on S. 1130 Before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1311, 1326 (1935). Thus, a state may, for
example, establish a second level of administrative review of benefits decisions. See Wilkinson
v. Abrams, 627 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1980).
114. See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971). Here the plaintiff challenged
a statute and regulation denying AFDC to children between the ages of 18-20 who attended
college. The court ruled that the Social Security Act's definition of "dependent child" was
intended to include such children. Because the statute and regulation conflicted with the Social
Security Act's standards, the court struck them down under the Supremacy Clause. See also
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-94 (1937); Buckstaff Bath House Co. v.
McKinley, 308 U.S. 358, 364 (1939).
115. See Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150
(1983) (invalidating a South Carolina statute which imposed a "voluntary quit" bar to eligibil-
ity and thereby conflicted with 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (a)(12)); International Union, United Auto-
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW v. Michigan Em-
ployment Security Comm'n, 517 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (invalidating a Michigan
statute that prevented payment when due, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 503 (a)(1), and that
effectuated a six-week penalty, in violation of 20 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(4)); Ohio Bureau of Em-
ployment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977) (upholding an Ohio statute as a permissible
exercise of discretion).
116. See supra text accompanying note I1.
117. The Supremacy Clause of Article VI provides that in case of a conflict, state law
must yield to federal law. Here, there is a conflict between 26 U.S.C. § 3304 and former Cal.
Unemp. Ins. Code § 1264-1. Therefore, § 3304 preempts § 1264-1.
118. See supra text accompanying note 112.
119. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 11342.1 (West 1979). "Each regulation adopted, to be effec-
tive, must be within the scope of authority conferred and in accordance with standards pre-
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Section 1264 does not require that an alien produce documentary
evidence of his immigration status in order to receive unemployment
benefits.120 This added requirement of documentary evidence renders
1264-1 inconsistent with section 1264 and, therefore, 1264-1 is inva-
lid. Regulation 1264-1 is invalid for yet another reason.
Administrative agencies often adopt regulations which serve as
interpretations of statutes. However, the courts function as the final
interpreters of statutes' 2' Regulation 1264-1 states that, in order to
be "permanently residing under color of law," an alien must present
documentary evidence from the INS. This evidence must state that
the INS has made an affirmative decision to permit the alien to re-
main in the United States.'22 However, the courts have already in-
terpreted this phrase. More specifically, Holley, Velasquez, Papado-
poulos, St. Francis, and Antillon12 have each held that INS
inaction or failure to deport will render an alien "permanently resid-
ing under color of law." Regulation 1264-1 misinterprets this
phrase. The EDD has therefore disregarded legal precedent and ig-
nored the court's authority as final arbiter of the law.' 4
IV. ADDING PRECISION TO A VAGUE DEFINITION
Adding precision to the present definition of "permanently re-
siding under color of law,"2' will reduce abuse of the meaning of
the term by the EDD and other state agencies. A series of guidelines
framed to the specific features of state unemployment programs will
clarify the meaning of this phrase. The following guidelines address
how a claimant can establish that he is "permanently residing under
color of law" for purposes of qualifying for unemployment
compensation.
A. INS Inaction and Knowledge of Presence
The first guideline concerns INS awareness of the claimant's
scribed by other provisions of law."
CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 11342.2 (West 1979). "[N]o regulation adopted is valid or effective
unless consistent and not in conflict with the statute ..
120. See supra text accompanying note 112.
121. Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d 697, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967).
122. See supra text accompanying note 112.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 48, 65, 71, 78 & 96.
124. On March 14, 1985 the EDD withdrew CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1264-1. (Con-
versation with Ralph Hilton, Assistant Chief Counsel, EDD, January 21, 1986.) The EDD,
however, has proposed regulations similar to § 1264-1 in the past and may continue to do so.
Thus, former § 1264-1 is useful for illustrative purposes.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 9-105.
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presence in the United States. The lawfulness of an alien's presence
in the United States is determined by the deportation statutes and
regulations. 12 Only those persons who, according to the terms of the
deportation statute are deportable, are unlawfully within the United
States. Until the INS determines that a person is deportable, the per-
son has a right to remain in the United States and has violated no
law.
Once the INS knows of a deportable claimant's presence in the
United States, it has the power and information necessary to enforce
his departure from the United States. Many alien claimants come to
the United States seeking to establish "permanent residence" status.
A petition for permanent resident status may be filed on the basis of
a relationship to a United States citizen who is a parent, spouse or
child.117 Alternatively, the alien claimant may base his petition on a
less direct relationship with a United States citizen or another per-
manent resident alien.128 At any rate, once this petition-or any ap-
plication-is filed with the INS, the INS knows of the alien claim-
ant's presence in the United States and can make a determination as
to whether the claimant is deportable. Thus, once the claimant
makes his presence in the United States known to the INS and the
INS fails to enforce any sanctions, he is residing in the United States
"under color of law." At that point, the INS has failed to enforce
sanctions upon a known violator.1 9 According to Holley, 30 "color of
law" means an authority's decision not to enforce penalties or other
sanctions upon a known violator.1 's That discussion compels the con-
clusion that a claimant should be permitted to present evidence of
INS knowledge and inaction in support of his claim. For instance,
copies of INS applications, extensions of voluntary departure, and
correspondence, should be submitted. As stated above, the plaintiff in
Velasquez'8" did not have official assurance that the INS would not
deport him. Nonetheless, the plaintiff was "permanently residing
under color of law." Therefore, a claimant may simply trace the
INS's history of inaction to support his claim. Official INS assurance
that deportation is not contemplated is not necessary to show INS
126. Holley, 553 F.2d at 850.
127. See supra note 126.
128. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (Supp. 1964); 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRA-
TION LAW & PROCEDURE § 2.18 (1984).
129. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
130. 553 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1977); see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 126-31.
132. 581 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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inaction.
B. Evidence of "Permanent Residence"
The next category of guidelines concerns evidence tending to
support or negate a finding of "permanent residence."
1. Nature of Residence
First of all, the claimant should offer proof concerning his resi-
dence in the United States. According to the INA, one's "residence"
is his principal, actual dwelling place."' Moreover, the DOL states
that "permanently residing" hinges on whether a claimant has been
residing "continuously for a long time."" 4 As a result, the claimant
should offer proof that he has resided continuously and for a long
time in his actual dwelling place. More specifically, the claimant
should prove continuous ownership of his home. Foreign nationals
often acquire real property in the United States without residing
here for an extended period of time. However, these persons usually
acquire property in connection with vacation homes and investment
ventures. These foreign nationals are rarely found waiting in line for
unemployment insurance benefits. Of course, evidence that the
claimant owns real property outside the United States would weaken
a claim for unemployment compensation benefits based on "color of
law." Often the claimant may not own his actual dwelling place. If
the claimant rents his abode, then proof of residence in the United
States continuously and for an extended period of time can still be
produced. Money order stubs, utility bills and postmarked envelopes
can verify that the claimant has resided in the United States continu-
ously for a long time. The claimant can produce that evidence at a
minimal expense and without burdening the INS.
2. Claimant's Relationship with the United States
Secondly, the claimant may present evidence that his relation-
ship with the United States is of a "continuous and lasting nature."
The INA states that such a continuing relationship is "perma-
nent."' 8 By extension, Holley held that this definition of "perma-
nent" indicates what is meant by "permanently residing."' 6 There-
133. See supra note 35.
134. See supra text accompanying note 19.
135. See supra text accompanying note 33.
136. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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fore, the claimant should demonstrate a continuing and lasting
relationship with the United States. For instance, the claimant can
prove that he has consistently filed federal income tax returns. By
complying with this requirement, the claimant shows that he has
established a relationship with the United States government. Also,
by consistently filing the returns, he demonstrates an adherence to
the INS definition of "permanent;" a relationship of continuing or
lasting nature can then be distinguished from a temporary one. Fi-
nally, this evidence will tend to negate the existence of a "transitory,
inchoate or temporary relationship" as discussed in Sudomir."37
3. Holley's "Particular Conditions"
Finally, the claimant should present evidence of "particular
conditions," such as those which existed in the Holley case."' The
Holley court held that the plaintiff was "permanently residing" be-
cause she was allowed to remain in the United States until her chil-
dren were no longer dependent upon her." 9 The INS decided not to
deport the plaintiff precisely because of this "particular condition."
Similarly, the claimant may show that his family members-who are
United States citizens-are dependent upon him.
C. Claimant's "Colorful" Attributes
In holding that a claimant is "permanently residing under color
of law," many unemployment compensation cases have emphasized
certain attributes of the claimant. Indeed, most administrative law
judges rely almost exclusively on these factors in determining
whether an alien has been "permanently residing under color of
law." 4 These attributes have not been codified as factors to consider
in determining "color of law" cases. Nonetheless, these attributes de-
serve formal recognition.
1. Family Members
An alien may acquire "permanent resident" status under the
Immigration and Nationality Act on the basis of a relationship to a
parent, spouse or child who is a United States citizen or permanent
137. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd., Case Nos. SJ-19173, SJ-197471, and SJ-
20021. The assertion presented in the text is based on a review of over 25 Cal. ALJ decisions.
[Vol. 26
UNDER COLOR OF LAW
resident.141 In recognition of this fact, administrative law judges in-
variably emphasize a claimant's family members and their immigra-
tion status to support their decisions. 42 They realize that the claim-
ant will eventually secure permanent resident status 4" on the basis
of existing family relationships. Yet, the administrative law judges
simply fail to isolate immigration status of family members as a de-
terminative consideration. At any rate, a claimant enhances his abil-
ity to qualify for unemployment benefits if he offers proof of family
relationships with United States citizens or permanent residents.
2. Employment Authorization
Employment authorization issued by the INS is another factor
to consider in determining eligibility under "color of law."144 The
Legislature did not intend to limit "color of law" to those cases
where the INS accords employment authorization. No such condition
precedent is explicitly found in section 3304(a)(14).' 4 However, if a
claimant does have employment authorization from the INS, this is
strong evidence that the INS knows of the claimant's presence in the
United States. Moreover, in authorizing the claimant to earn wages
in the United States, the INS is in effect sanctioning the claimant's
presence. If the INS grants employment authorization and makes no
effort to deport the claimant, there is INS inaction in addition to
knowledge of the claimant's presence. Therefore, according to Hol-
ley," the claimant is residing in the United States "under color of
law."
3. Claimant Belief
A plaintiff's belief is an element of many causes of action. A
claim for unemployment benefits should be no exception. Indeed, ad-
ministrative law judges often support a finding of "color of law"
with the claimant's belief that he has a legal right to reside in the
United States.
According to Holley, "color of law" covers situations which are,
in strict terms, outside the law but near its border.' 47 Therefore,
141. See supra notes 128-29.
142. See, e.g., Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd., Case Nos. SJ-18718, SJ-18542, SJ-
18380. The assertion presented in the text is based on a review of over 25 Cal. ALJ decisions.
143. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(20) (1964).
144. See supra note 62.
145. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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some semblance of a legal right is sufficient to substantiate a finding
of "color of law." The claimant may be waiting for the INS to pro-
cess his application for permanent resident status. He is not unlaw-
fully within the United States at that point because the INS has not
deported him; he has a right to remain in the United States until the
INS determines that he is deportable. 1 8 He is, in fact, here under
some semblance of a legal right, or "under color of law." As a result,
the claimant's subjective belief that he has a legal right to be in the
United States is not unfounded. In support of his claim for unem-
ployment benefits, the claimant should be allowed to present a sworn
statement to his state agency. The claimant can assert that he has a
legal right to reside in the United States. Whether the INS contem-
plates deporting a claimant is often considered in deciding "color of
law" cases. INS intentions are not ignored." 9 Similarly, the claim-
ant's subjective belief should not be overlooked. His intentions also
deserve consideration.
The claimant should be allowed to offer evidence of the factors
included under each guideline. Ideally, the claimant can satisfy all
three guidelines: INS inaction and knowledge of his presence, his
"permanent residence," and his "colorful" attributes. In such a case,
the claimant should automatically qualify for unemployment bene-
fits. However, this combination may not always be possible. If no
evidence exists to support any of the above guidelines, the presump-
tion should be that the claimant is not "permanently residing under
color of law."
On the other hand, the claimant may offer evidence of only
some of the factors included in the guidelines. In this case, INS inac-
tion and knowledge of claimant's presence are of primary impor-
tance. This guideline is the focus of Holley and subsequent cases
which have adhered to the Holley'5" ruling. A showing of INS inac-
tion and knowledge should be combined with one other factor in ei-
ther the "permanent residence" or " 'colorful' attributes" categories
to find a color of law residency. For instance, the claimant may show
that he has corresponded with the INS (INS knowledge of claimant's
presence), and that he has not been deported (INS inaction). Addi-
149. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
149. See supra text accompanying notei 48, 65, 78, 86-89 & 96.
150. See supra text accompanying note 65. In Velasquez, 561 F. Supp. 16 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), the court stated that once the plaintiff demonstrates INS inaction, the state agency must
be responsible to demonstrate INS intentions. Therefore, INS intentions have been respected
in deciding "color of law" cases. The claimant deserves the same opportunity to show his
subjective belief.
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tionally, by submitting a marriage certificate, he can show that he
has a spouse who is a United States citizen. This documentary evi-
dence should be accepted by the state agency or adjudicator in sup-
port of the claimant's request for unemployment benefits.
Although judges will find these guidelines useful, legislators
should also recognize these items. Legislative provisions based on
these guidelines would improve the efficiency of unemployment com-
pensation programs across the country. Once the claimant is allowed
to provide his own proof of real property ownership, family relation-
ships, and tax returns the process of distributing unemployment ben-
efits can be expedited. Reliance on information from outside agencies
such as the INS inevitably leads to administrative "red tape" and
delayed receipt of benefits. On the other hand, self certification such
as the Guide Card used in California has led to inaccurate informa-
tion and unauthorized disbursements.1"' As a middle ground, state
employment security agencies should be required to accept certified
proof of the factors mentioned above.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1977, Holley v. Lavine construed the language "permanently
residing under color of law."'1 2 The Second Circuit held that an
alien is "permanently residing in the United States" if: 1) his rela-
tionship with the United States is of a continuing or lasting na-
ture, 1 83 and 2) he is allowed to remain in the United States until
"particular conditions" change.'" Moreover, an alien is residing in
the United States "under color of law" if the INS knows of his pres-
ence and takes no action to deport him."5 However, widespread
abuse in the disbursement of unemployment benefits is painful proof
of the inadequacy of the common law definition of the term. Many
persons who are "permanently residing under color of law" in Cali-
fornia and elsewhere have been wrongfully denied unemployment
benefits.
In an effort to remedy this problem, this comment has proposed
three guidelines for determining alien eligibility for unemployment
benefits. These guidelines clarify the meaning of "permanently resid-
ing in the United States under color of law." Moreover, adherence to
151. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying note 41.
153. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 48.
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these guidelines will improve the efficiency of unemployment com-
pensation programs. If the claimant is allowed to present proof with-
out resorting to outside agencies, he will receive benefits without un-
due delay. Finally, these guidelines acknowledge the financial and
language barriers of most alien unemployment claimants. If a claim-
ant must provide proof from the INS or other agencies prior to re-
ceiving benefits, he will undoubtedly incur expenses connected with
travel, long-distance calls and administrative fees. Claimants who are
not proficient in English face the additional hardship of procuring
assistance in writing letters, making calls and understanding admin-
istrative procedures. Under the proposed guidelines, however, com-
munication with outside agencies is minimized. As a result, financial
and language barriers should not interfere with the receipt of
benefits.
Legislators, judges, and the legal community in general, must
act to halt the unjustified denial of unemployment benefits. The pro-
posed guidelines are but one contribution in this respect. Only
through a systematic approach can legal decisionmakers put an end
to the confusion and abuse behind the various interpretations of
"permanently residing under color of law." This comment has em-
phasized the need to respect legislative mandate and judicial prece-
dent in order to properly interpret and apply this phrase. Whatever
specific legislative and judicial action is taken, those involved must be
careful to conform to principles found in statutory provisions and in
the common law.
Blanca Zarazia
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